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Cyberwar – Die Gefahr aus dem Netz
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Business Secrets are
confidential information of a company,
and protected by law.
Protection requires efforts by the owning
company to protect their data following
the state of the art.
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The KASTEL Demonstrator
What we demonstrate?
An approach to ensure that no Business Secrets are stored.
Demonstrator: Spinning Wheel
Availability of Hard- and Software
Already used as a Demonstrator
What we want to show:
The attacker does not learn the
number of turns by observing the
current state.
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System & Attacker Model
Level 4: enterprise level
Level 3: company level
Level 2: process level
Level 1: control level



















Focus on the PLC system
Attacker can observe only one system state
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The Software
Introduction The Software The Verification Closing Remarks
Weigl – I4.0 Demonstrator 10. Oct. 2019 7/22
Operator view
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Operator view
Automatic Mode
PLC drives to user-defined segments sequentially
A segment consists of position, velocity, accel-/decelaration, break time
Sequence can be repeatedly executed
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Operator view
Manual Mode
Operator can manually control velocity, and
set the reference position
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Reactive Software
Executed every n ms
Feedback loop
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SequenceAutomaton(); FUNCTION BLOCK SequenceAutomaton
INIT IDLE
WAIT MOVEDONE
MainAxis(); FUNCTION BLOCK MainAxis
States: INIT, ENABLE, DISABLE, REF, HALT,
IDLE, JOGCWSLOW, JOGCWFAST, DRIVER-
AMP, JOGCCWSLOW, JOGCCWFAST, VE-
LOCITY, MOVEACTIVE, RESET, ERROR
Hardware: MOTOR
Update HMI; Human Machine Interface
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Preparation for Verification
Software not directly usable
focus on MainAxis
demote floating-point to integers
reduce state, remove assignment to HMI variables











PLC Program to be Verified
421 LoC in Structured Text
32 states variables, 52 input variables
566 bits large (270 bits input, 296 bits state)
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The Verification
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Information Flow
What we want to show:
The attacker does not learn the number of turns since the start of the PLC by
observing the current state.









Prob(#Turns) = Prob(#Turns | σt0)
v(t) – Angular Speed ( degs )
Classical Information Flow
Property: No influence of v(t) on the state.
. . . Non-interference is too strong: Velocity is stored internally!
. . . of course sensors values have influence
. . . but #Turns is not stored.
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Forgetting Information
Idea
Relaxing the information flow
Allowing the system to react to current sensor values
. . . but forget old information
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Forgetting Information
Idea
Relaxing the information flow
Allowing the system to react to current sensor values
. . . but forget old information
Example: Baffle Gate
Granting access based on
permission
But does not store amount of
passed
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Forgetting Information
Idea
Relaxing the information flow
Allowing the system to react to current sensor values
. . . but forget old information
Privacy-preservation by forgetting
System is allowed to store secret data of m last steps.
. . . σn+0 σn+1 σn+2 σn+3 σn+4 σn+5 σn+6
guessableprotected ü
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Forgetting Information in
Relational Test Tables
# ASSUME ASSERT 
S IL IH S
0 = = — — 1
1 — = — — —
2 — = = — k
3 — = = = ω
We distinguish between
state variables (|S| = 32)
uncritical sensor variables (|IL| = 51), and
protected sensor variable (|IH | = 1, angular velocity).
Syntax
“—” expresses “DON’T CARE”
“=” expresses equality in columns variables
k is the allowed lookbehind
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Forgetting Information in
Relational Test Tables
# ASSUME ASSERT 
S IL IH S
0 = = — — 1
1 — = — — —
2 — = = — k
3 — = = = ω
Explanation
For all possible two runs of the systems, starting in
arbitrary, but equal, states and equal uncritical input IL,
then injecting different secrets,
after waiting k cycles
the states have to be equal
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Results
The system does not adhere to information forgetting.
for k = 2, 5, 7, 10
Analysation of the counterexample
last velocity is stored internally
but not last velocity is not overwritten forcibly
If we do not consider the internal stored velocity, the system forgets the
information.
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Discussion: Validity
Why PLC level?
Protection on . . .
PLC level is hard
upper pyramid level easier and known
but also attacks on the sensor/actuator level happened
Single observable state
If an attacker sees a sequence of states, then
the information of the sequence leak
information that are k cycles past are still secret
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Discussion: Validity
Only MainAxis
MainAxis is the most critical
HMI also reads the velocity from global state
An attacker can get the complete user-defined program sequence
Program transformation
Demoting floating point to integer is critical
. . . justification in each individual case
Symb. Execution and other simplification are uncritical
Verification
Starting in arbitrary equal states is an over-abstraction
Spurious counterexample possible
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Closing Remarks
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Quantification
In view of KASTEL continuation:
Information Forgetting is a Quantification of Security
Quantifiations




In the view of risk assessment
A system, that forgets faster, decreases the costs when a data breach occurs.
Introduction The Software The Verification Closing Remarks
Weigl – I4.0 Demonstrator 10. Oct. 2019 21/22
Quantification
In view of KASTEL continuation:
Information Forgetting is a Quantification of Security
Quantifiations




In the view of risk assessment
A system, that forgets faster, decreases the costs when a data breach occurs.
Introduction The Software The Verification Closing Remarks
Weigl – I4.0 Demonstrator 10. Oct. 2019 21/22
Quantification
In view of KASTEL continuation:
Information Forgetting is a Quantification of Security
Quantifiations




In the view of risk assessment
A system, that forgets faster, decreases the costs when a data breach occurs.
Introduction The Software The Verification Closing Remarks
Weigl – I4.0 Demonstrator 10. Oct. 2019 21/22
Conclusion
Take away
We can prove that systems forget information
Forgetting information is a quantitative privacy property
It does not prevent attacks, but the loot is reduced.
Technical Report appears soon
Verification software available:
https://github.com/verifaps/verifaps-lib
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